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What are the key factors underpinning the stand-oﬀ between Russia and the West over Ukraine?
Roland Dannreuther writes that while tensions escalated in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, the Arab Spring had a signiﬁcant role in framing the eventual confrontation.
He notes that disagreements over the West’s intervention in Libya had a key impact on the
domestic balance of power within Russia, while fears of protest movements threatening the regime
of Vladimir Putin helped foster a deep suspicion of Western approaches to democracy promotion.
The perception that the world is returning to a new Cold War is most closely associated with
developments in Europe during 2014. This includes the Russian annexation of Crimea, the support provided by
Moscow to the secessionists in Eastern Ukraine, and the subsequent Western imposition of economic sanctions on
Russia.
However, in the previous three years from 2011-2014, it was the Middle East where conﬂict between the West and
Russia showed the most visible signs of renewed forms of Cold War-style confrontation. The main catalyst for this
was Russian and Western divisions over policy towards Syria and whether or not to support the overthrow of the
regime of Bashar al-Assad.
But the roots of the conﬂict between Russia and the West were both broader and more comprehensive, involving a
fundamental disagreement about how to conceptualise and understand the changes heralded by the Arab Spring.
Understanding these more substantive causes for the conﬂicting Russian and Western views of the Middle East
provide signiﬁcant insights into the subsequent Russian response toward Ukraine.
Russia, Syria and the Arab Spring: supporting the Arab counter-revolution
In a recent article in the Journal of European Integration, I argue that the consequences of the Arab Spring on
Russian-Western relations had three main dimensions. The ﬁrst is that the Russian abstention in March 2011 over
the UN Resolution mandating humanitarian intervention in Libya was the trigger for a major shift in domestic political
power in Russia.
President Dmitry Medvedev supported this abstention, and was rumoured to have supported a vote in favour,
reﬂecting his determination to maintain cordial relations with the West and to protect Obama’s ‘reset’ policy. But
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin strongly criticised the decision not to veto the resolution, arguing that it ‘allows anyone
to do anything they want – to take any actions against a sovereign state. Basically, all this reminds me of is a
medieval appeal for a crusade’. Medvedev then responded, stating that ‘it was inexcusable to use expressions…
such as “crusades”’.
At the time, this altercation was interpreted as a politically stage managed diﬀerence of elite opinion, meeting the
diﬀering expectations of domestic and international audiences. But, in retrospect, this moment was pivotal. It marked
the point where elite and popular support and opinion decisively shifted from Medvedev, or more importantly the
liberalising and modernising agenda that he represented, to Putin and his more instinctive anti-Western, inward-
looking and conservative agenda. The Libyan conﬂict, and particularly the events which led to NATO military
intervention and the death of Muammar Gaddaﬁ, provided the political assurance for the success of Putin’s
leadership campaign to be re-elected President.
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News conference held by Vladimir Putin in December 2014, Credit: kremlin.ru
The second dimension is how Putin, and Russian analysts more generally, viewed Western policies in the Middle
East through the lenses of their own concerns over Western inﬂuence and ambitions in Russia and the post-Soviet
space. The anxiety was particularly acute as the
crises in both Libya and Syria coincided with the rise
of opposition to the re-election of Putin, with
unprecedented large opposition rallies in Moscow
and other cities in Russia during 2011-12.
For Putin and his entourage, there were clear
parallels with Western democracy promotion in the
Middle East and rising opposition and societal conﬂict
within Russia. The lesson they took from events in
Libya and Syria was that the West’s commitment to
‘democracy’ meant a willingness to break up
societies, to use force, and to impose the wishes of
an elite pro-Western minority on the majority. The
interpretation was that ‘we must not allow the ‘Libyan
scenario’ to be reproduced in Syria’. Even more
important, of course, was that the ‘Libyan scenario’
should not be reproduced in Russia or in key neighbours, such as Ukraine.
The ﬁnal dimension reﬂects the more intellectual rationalisation of this negative view of Western democracy
promotion. This is often ignored as there is a tendency to explain Russian behaviour in rather simple geopolitical
zero-sum terms. Although this is undoubtedly an important element, there is also a more serious ideational or
ideological foundation to this opposition.
This can be seen in the development in the mid-2000s of the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’. The intellectual core
of this concept, developed by Vladislav Surkov, is the rejection of liberal pluralist conceptions of democracy requiring
the division of society into competing factional groups. For conservative Russian elites, the evidence of the Arab
Spring conﬁrms that such factional divisions in the guise of democracy promotion only lead to internal disorder,
societal conﬂict and the loss of the sovereign integrity of the state. There is, for such elites, a resonance with Russia
in the 1990s when the country came close to internal disintegration and civil conﬂict.
Liberal democracy is not necessarily rejected out of hand. The ‘sovereign democracy’ concept does not exclude the
fact that such a form of state might be appropriate for advanced post-industrial Western societies where the
underlying political culture is suﬃciently consensual to permit such open dissension without undermining the
integrity of the state. However, the concept articulates the view that this is not appropriate for most states, not only in
places like the Middle East but also in Russia, which have diﬀerent inherited historical and political cultures, and
where any attempt to implement this would lead to the loss of sovereignty and conﬂict and anarchy.
The evolution of Western-Russian divisions and confrontation in the Middle East, and particularly over Syria, provide
a number of key insights into explaining why Russia responded in the way that it did to the ensuring crisis in
Ukraine. While Russia succeeded in resisting Western pressure and attempts to de-seat Assad in Syria, it failed to
do so with President Yanukovych in Ukraine. What Russia was not willing to do in 2014 was to submit to this as a
fait accompli as it had done in Libya.
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